The British Army and the Peace Process in Ireland by McInnes, Colin & Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline
The British Army and the Peace Process in Ireland 
by Colin McInnes and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the dynamics of peace processes in intra-state conflicts such as Northern 
Ireland is one of the major challenges facing contemporary security studies.1 This is 
perhaps understandable given the widespread view that violent conflicts are now more 
likely to occur than in previous decades, and that they are likely to be fought within states 
rather than between them.2 This article looks at a particular problem within the study of 
peace processes - that of the role of the military - by focusing on the British Army's role 
in the Northern Ireland peace process. The article argues that the Army was central to the 
beginning of the peace process through denying the Irish Republican Army (IRA) a 
military victory, despite a paramilitary campaign which had lasted well over two 
decades.3 The IRA in 1999 seemed on the verge of accepting both the Good Friday 
Agreement and the turn by Sinn Féin to constitutional politics. However, despite what 
appears to be the endgame of violence in the province, the British Army remains a 
significant factor in the politics of Northern Ireland for a variety of reasons.  
The first is that until the issue of the decommissioning of paramilitary arms has been 
satisfactorily resolved, the Army will continue to play an important security role. The 
continued presence of the Army acts as a reassurance to Unionists against large-scale 
violence by Republican paramilitaries, such as the IRA or breakaway groups. For some, 
if not all, Nationalists an Army presence also provides confidence against a resurgence of 
Loyalist paramilitary violence.4 The question is, however, what form that military 
presence should take during this peace process. Demands for the demilitarizaton of 
Northern Ireland and the actual dismantling of some of the security apparatus which has 
come to characterize the province, such as the watch towers within cities and the 
checkpoints and closure orders on border roads, formed part of the Nationalist dialogue 
long before the ceasefires of 1994. The peace process has therefore been in military terms 
a balancing act between the competing demands of a continued Army presence with the 
need to reduce the more militaristic evidence of a troop presence and return the region to 
"normality." Under the Conservative governments of John Major, the balance was struck 
in favor of maintaining a substantial military presence (until the IRA had disarmed), but 
even so a number of changes were introduced in the Army role to encourage cross-
community support for the peace process. The "New" Labour government of Tony Blair, 
which was elected in 1997, has continued to link reductions in the Army's presence to the 
decommissioning of IRA arms. Implicit in Labour's policy is that, once decommissioning 
progresses, military activity will be considerably scaled down. It is also the case that 
successive British governments have taken proactive steps to modify the Army's presence 
to encourage Republicans to engage in dialogue. In a break with previous British policy, 
Blair has demonstrated that he understands that any movement toward a lasting peace 
settlement must also address the issue of the recent British military past in Ireland and he 
has, among other measures, established a new inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday 
in 1972.  
This understanding of the central importance that troops have played in the collective 
memory of the province underlines the symbolic nature of the British Army in the peace 
process. For Sinn Féin the slogan "troops out" traditionally reflected a defining belief that 
peace could only be achieved when the British Army left the "island of Ireland." 
However, for Unionists the Army affirms the continuation of the political union with 
Britain. What is interesting, however, is that during the last few years, the "troops out" 
agenda, long advocated by Republicans and supported by some left wing members of the 
Labour Party, has been partially, but not totally, subsumed under the broader Nationalist 
agenda of constitutional change and a process of gradual demilitarization. Even before 
the Good Friday Agreement, Nationalists, while still deploring the military presence and 
the behavior of some regiments, increasingly modified their argument from one of 
immediately ejecting the British Army from Ireland to a consideration of how, in the 
short to medium term, a reduced Army presence would fit alongside new devolved 
institutions. This is not to argue that Republicans and Nationalists do not want a British 
military withdrawal - they do - but to point out that the peace process has robbed 
Republicans of some of their most potent arguments. In particular, British governments 
have argued for nearly a decade that they have no desire to prolong a military or strategic 
presence in Ireland and that they wish to oversee military withdrawal when the IRA has 
laid down its arms.  
The continuing debate over the future of policing structures in the province and the 
deeply held suspicions within the Catholic community over the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) also mean that the role of the British military in the peace process is 
linked to the controversial issue of policing. Since the ceasefires of 1994, the central issue 
is whether the RUC (or the successor body recommended by the Patten Commission) will 
be able to "police" Northern Ireland in a manner which is acceptable to both communities 
without substantial military support. Although the British government, under pressure 
from Sinn Féin and the Irish government in the South, has continued to pursue the aim of 
a military "downsizing" from Ireland (somewhat ironically until the issue of new police 
structures in Ireland has been resolved to the satisfaction of both communities, especially 
during the marching seasons) British troops will remain in place, albeit in a peacekeeping 
not a counter-insurgency role.  
The beginning of the peace process is usually traced to an initiative by the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, during 1989-90. Rather than provide a detailed 
chronology of the peace process, we have focused on four key moments to examine the 
manner in which the Army was an issue in this process: the 1989-90 Brooke initiative; 
the IRA's 1994 ceasefire; the 1996 Mitchell Report; and the 1998 Stormont Agreement 
(the "Good Friday Agreement"). Throughout the process the Army remained a source of 
controversy for Republicans and the Southern Irish government. These concerns were 
not, however, fully addressed by John Major's Conservative governments, which 
focussed instead on the issues of decommissioning and political structures. There are 
indications of an awareness by London of the Army as an issue, and indeed some 
initiatives were undertaken, such as the attempt to reduce the number of troops deployed 
in Northern Ireland. But the parliamentary weakness of the government after the 1992 
General Election led to increased Unionist influence over the government and this in turn 
made it difficult to address the issue of the Army directly.5 It was only with Tony Blair's 
New Labour government that the issues surrounding the Army's presence in Northern 
Ireland began to be addressed more fully by the British government.  
The Army and the Troubles: 1969-90  
Although the British Army's presence in Northern Ireland pre-dated the "troubles," it was 
only in 1969, when the indigenous police forces proved unable to contain the explosion 
of inter-communal violence, that troops were deployed in an internal security role.6 The 
initial military role was to support the police. In effect, however, the Army replaced the 
police. Within a year of deployment the conflict changed from one of ethnic conflict 
policed by the British troops, to one of confrontation between Republicans and the British 
Army. This was due in part to the failure by the British government to implement 
political reforms to the Stormont regime, but also to the emergence of the Provisional 
IRA.7 The Army's response drew heavily on its colonial experiences. Tactics included the 
imposition of curfews, intrusive searches of Catholic areas and, during 1971, the use of 
internment (imprisonment without trial), which was used initially only in Catholic areas. 
These tactics, as is now well documented, proved counter-productive and led to a rallying 
of support for the IRA. The "Irish troubles" became for the British a question of subduing 
this threat. Troop numbers were increased, peaking in 1972 at just over 22,000. By the 
mid-1970s the British Army had managed to contain the situation militarily and to push 
the IRA out of the cities and into rural areas. Yet the short-term military success hid the 
failure at a political level to address the question of what the British long-term political 
aim in Ireland was. In particular, the failure in 1974 of the Sunningdale Agreement, 
which had attempted to introduce a power-sharing assembly into the province, meant that 
there was no immediate political solution in sight.8  
The British Labour government in the mid-late 1970s decided to redraw the security 
arrangements in Northern Ireland. The central element was an attempt to "normalize" the 
situation by focusing on the RUC (and the locally recruited Ulster Defence Regiment) 
and policing rather than the Army. A process of "Ulsterization," "criminalization" and 
"police primacy" allowed the RUC to take the leading role in security issues. This in turn 
permitted a reduction in the British military profile in Ireland and the withdrawal of some 
troops. The most controversial aspect of the Army's activities at this time, however, was 
the deployment of the Special Air Service (SAS) in 1976.9 Concerns were raised over the 
SAS's commitment to minimum force, over who directed their operations and over the 
very legality of some of their actions. By the mid-1980s, however, it was clear that 
special forces were a central element in the fight against the IRA by the Conservative 
government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Despite the continuing ability of the 
IRA to carry out operations both in Northern Ireland and in England, by the late 1980s a 
number of commentators began to argue that the police and Army had successfully 
reduced fatalities to acceptable levels and that the security forces now held the 
initiative.10 Indeed, by the end of the 1980s 20 years of Republican violence had 
produced few gains and it was widely held that the Republican strategy of the "ballot box 
and armalite" had failed to achieve substantial political victories.11
By 1990-91, the years when the peace process began, the Army's role was largely one of 
supporting the RUC in internal security - the main exceptions to this being intelligence 
gathering and use of special forces. For the majority of troops, Northern Ireland was now 
a dull, routine posting. Nor was it particularly dangerous. Although care still had to be 
exercised, fatalities for British troops had fallen such that they were little or no higher 
than other operational postings. In 1991, for example, only five fatalities were suffered by 
the Army in Northern Ireland, half of the number killed in the previous year.12 Operations 
for infantry battalions, even before the peace process, were curtailed by political 
considerations and police primacy. Although in some areas the police still rarely ventured 
out without military protection, more generally troops had begun to stay in their barracks, 
deploying only when the RUC requested support. The role of leg infantry had also been 
reduced by the Army's growing use of Special Forces.13 For the most part, the British 
Army did little more than man check points and observation posts, and conduct routine 
patrols in areas of particular difficulty. It was also the Army who usually dealt with 
vehicle and house searches. Nevertheless, over the years the British Army had built up a 
visible presence through the construction of military installations. A network of purpose-
built barracks, bases and forts covered Northern Ireland, surveillance cameras operated in 
the main cities long before they became commonplace in England and Belfast City 
airport was heavily protected from attack. IRA operations had led to the fortification of 
military bases with concrete bunkers and wire, creating "urban citadels,"14 while the 
border area had been heavily militarized and many roads remained closed. Security 
considerations pervaded every aspect of Northern Irish life. The new motorway system 
around Belfast, for example, was constructed in the 1980s as much to ensure rapid Army 
access to trouble spots in the city as to facilitate civilian travel.15  
The Army's relationship with Northern Ireland prior to the peace process was complex. 
For some years in the 1970s and the 1980s it had offered the benefits of "real soldiering" 
and played to the Army's traditional strengths of individual and collective skills. It was 
also, in many respects, a more traditional role for the military than that which it held 
within NATO. As a small professional Army its history had been dominated by imperial 
policing rather than major conventional war. Indeed, when engaged in such wars in the 
twentieth century the Army's character had changed dramatically, involving large 
numbers of volunteers and conscripts as well as a small professional core.16 Yet 
throughout these years, the Soviet Union remained the single greatest threat to British 
security and, therefore, the defence of West Germany remained the single most important 
commitment for the Army. This was where the bulk of the Army's resources were 
focused, and although in the early 1970s Northern Ireland briefly assumed greater 
immediate significance, by the 1980s West Germany had regained its status as the 
priority commitment. Indeed, the pressure from commitments overseas as well as the 
process of "normalisation" had impacted upon policy in Northern Ireland. In the mid-
1980s Irish regiments of the British Army, which traditionally had not served in Northern 
Ireland, were deployed for service in the Province.17 This decision allowed a degree of 
relief for other infantry regiments. The deployment also came about as a result of the 
closer security links forged between London and Dublin after the signing of the Anglo-
Irish Agreement in 1985. The Agreement for the first time gave the Southern Irish 
government a more formal role in regard to the security affairs of the North and led to 
developments such as the establishment of a Police Complaints Commission and the 
publication of a document summarizing complaints procedures against the Army.18  
A number of points therefore can be made concerning the Army's presence in Northern 
Ireland at the time when the peace process began. Most obviously, the presence of the 
Army was controversial. Catholics had welcomed the Army in 1969 as a force to protect 
them from Protestant violence. This honeymoon period had quickly soured. Nationalists 
continued to perceive in certain activities of the military a campaign against the Catholic 
community in general and support for Unionist ambitions in particular. The Army's 
presence therefore was politicized at an early stage of the troubles. The military presence 
was also a highly visible one, particularly in certain areas of Belfast and 
Londonderry/Derry and on the border. In urban areas foot patrols, low flying helicopters, 
watch towers and military checkpoints became commonplace. The British Army, 
therefore, could not be ignored and it impacted upon the social and economic fabric of 
life in the province. Further, patrols were armed, soldiers wore body armor and helmets, 
and their bases were heavily fortified. For Republicans therefore, the ideology of the 
British Army as an army of occupation found ready confirmation in what they saw with 
their own eyes. Activities of Army special forces proved consistently controversial and 
arguably illegal, compounding the distrust felt by the Nationalist community. In 
particular, Army special forces (as well as the UDR and parts of the the RUC) remained 
dogged by allegations that it had operated a "shoot to kill" policy.19  
The process of "Ulsterisation" had meant that security was considered a matter for the 
police. But the RUC could only "police" Northern Ireland because of the support of the 
Army. Indeed, despite Ulsterisation troop levels never fell appreciably below 10,000, 
while after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement numbers were increased to deal 
with an upsurge of Loyalist paramilitary violence. By the beginning of the peace process 
in the early 1990s there were approximately 12,500 troops on tour of duty in Northern 
Ireland, many of them from infantry battalions. When linked to post-Cold War reductions 
and deployments in both the Gulf and Bosnia, this commitment had created a degree of 
overstretch within the British Army. There is, however, no concrete evidence to suggest 
that the peace process was motivated by concerns to reduce military overstretch, although 
some scholars have argued that overall the huge cost of maintaining the economic and 
military presence in the province was a source of considerable political concern for the 
British government by 1990.20 By this time it was clear that the Army would stay in 
Northern Ireland for the foreseeable future and certainly beyond the establishment of 
political structures as detailed in the Good Friday Agreement. The agenda, however, had 
moved on from questions over the Army's presence in Northern Ireland. With 
Republicans adopting a more constitutional approach and the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement, the old battle cry of "troops out" was progressively replaced (though never 
wholly removed) by questions of how the Army might fit into the new political structures 
and how the legacy of the Army's role in the troubles might be addressed.  
The Origins of the Peace Process 
The early 1990s saw a series of profound changes in the political landscape of Northern 
Ireland. Among the most important of these was that Sinn Féin, the political wing of the 
IRA, attempted to become central to constitutional politics in Northern Ireland. Twenty 
years of activity by Republican paramilitaries had not achieved the removal of the British 
presence, nor was there any sign of a imminent military breakthrough by the IRA. 
Indeed, there is evidence that by the turn of the decade certain elements in the Republican 
movement had concluded that they could not win the armed struggle and had ordered a 
reappraisal. Crucially, this turn to constitutionalism reinforced the earlier rejection of the 
historic policy of abstentionism (through which Sinn Féin had refused to contest elections 
in Southern Ireland) and a movement toward constitutional Nationalism.21 Gerry Adams 
had long accepted that his party on its own could not engineer substantial inroads into the 
political process. This recognition meant that Sinn Féin was now prepared to work with 
John Hume's more moderate but Nationalist Socialist Democratic Labour Party (SDLP).  
These local developments must also be set against the background of the renewed 
optimism in Europe on the resolution of ethnic conflict in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War, as well as progress in resolving two other longstanding conflicts, in the Middle 
East and in South Africa. The end of the Cold War and collapse of anti-imperialist 
movements elsewhere had made revolutionary ideologies appear obsolete. As Mick Cox 
has argued:  
Logistically [the IRA] could fight on . . .. But having the capacity to bomb and shoot was 
one thing. This was hardly the same as being part of a broader international movement 
whose goal was the liberation of humanity from the oppressive grip of imperialism . . .. 
As the tide of anti-imperialism continued to ebb, the republican movement in Ireland 
increasingly began to resemble some beached political whale without a wider purpose - 
other than to go on killing people in Britain and Ireland in a campaign that seemed to be 
going nowhere, and about which old friends and comrades elsewhere were saying had 
been rendered meaningless by changes in the wider international environment.22  
The British government, in response to these changes, attempted to find ways to 
marginalize what it perceived to be a groundswell of support within the Nationalist 
community for Sinn Féin and attempted to cultivate new political structures which could 
attract moderate Nationalist opinion. Part of this involved an acceptance by the British 
government that Dublin should be engaged in the process of change in Northern Ireland 
and decisive moves were now made to include Dublin in wider political negotiations. 
More controversially it also involved the recognition by the British security services that 
a secret channel similar to that used during previous ceasefires should be opened to the 
IRA. The belief here was that Sinn Féin might be persuaded or coerced into exerting 
pressure upon the IRA to relinquish its campaign.  
The Brooke Initiative  
Under the influence of Peter Brooke, the British government in 1989-90 sought to build 
upon the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement to achieve a greater devolution for Northern Irish 
affairs. In November 1989, Brooke intimated that he might be willing to be "creative" in 
response to an approach from the IRA. Brooke drew an analogy between the British 
presence in Cyprus in the 1950s and the current situation in Northern Ireland. He pointed 
out that despite spirited proclamations of a permanent military presence, the British had 
eventually withdrawn from Cyprus. He also mused over whether the strategy of 
containment in Ireland had actually worked.23 The publication of Brooke's views caused a 
furore, particularly among sections of the Unionist community. In addition, Michael 
Oatley, a British Secret Service (MI6) agent, was given permission to use the secret 
"back channel" to open a dialogue with Sinn Féin. Oatley's initiative was to prove 
decisive. For the next crucial months contacts remained active, persuading Brooke that it 
might be possible to influence a divided Republican movement.24 The British government 
also authorized the release to Sinn Féin of an advance copy of a speech which Brooke 
was going to make in London.25 Throughout the speech the British presence in Ireland 
was presented as a "neutral" force and the legitimacy of both Unionist and Nationalists 
views was acknowledged. Of the former, it was accepted that Northern Ireland would not 
be ceded from the UK without the consent of the majority; but Brooke also said that it 
was understood that the minority had concerns and aims which, if pursued through 
democratic, non-violent means, were equally legitimate. Critically, Brooke argued that 
Westminster had no "selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland." Brooke 
went on to state that the British presence had three different parts: the Army, the Northern 
Ireland Office, including financing by the British Exchequer, and the Unionist population 
which regarded itself as British. On the military presence, the Secretary of State argued 
that the United Kingdom did not want to sustain high troop levels in Northern Ireland but 
that soldiers were there as long as they were needed to protect the police from 
paramilitary attacks. Once the threat to the police had been removed, troops could be, and 
would be, withdrawn.26  
Brooke appeared to be "bargaining" with the IRA over the presence of troops. This 
represented a major departure from the line generally taken by the Thatcher 
administration. Mrs Thatcher had previously argued that Northern Ireland was "as British 
as Finchley" (her Parliamentary constituency in London); Brooke was now arguing that 
the Army was deployed only in support of the police and was not a natural presence in 
Northern Ireland. Brooke's efforts to bring together the constitutional parties in Northern 
Ireland led to the notion of "talks about talks" to be conducted along lines originally 
advocated in the 1980s by SDLP leader John Hume. Discussions would take place 
between the political parties in the North; between Dublin and Belfast and between 
Dublin and London.27 These three distinct but related aspects became known as the 
"strands" and continued to provide the structure of negotiations until the Good Friday 
Agreement. Establishing the talks process proved complicated, with arguments revolving 
around largely secondary issues such as where the talks should be held and who should 
chair the sessions.28 When the talks did eventually get under way, continuing violence by 
the IRA meant that Sinn Féin was excluded, limiting what could be achieved.29  
Under Peter Brooke, therefore, the British appeared to move decisively on the Army's 
role. Through his statement that the British government had no "strategic interest" in the 
island, Brooke had suggested an unexpected flexibility. However, just as some 
government advisers recognized the importance of including Sinn Féin in the process 
(leading Peter Brooke to authorize the establishment of the secret "back channel" to the 
Sinn Féin leadership), so others argued vehemently against their inclusion in any form of 
political dialogue and advocated rather a concerted security initiative in the face of 
continuing violence from both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries. Indeed, a number 
of senior military and police officers in late 1991 went as far as to argue that internment 
should be brought back including Sir Hugh Annersley, the then Chief Constable of the 
RUC.30  
Part of what Brooke had done in this period was to undermine many of the arguments 
that Sinn Féin had traditionally put forward as to why the British maintained a military 
presence in the province. Sinn Féin had argued that a wholly neutral Ireland was contrary 
to the wishes of Britain and NATO as it would increase the vulnerability of the Atlantic 
sea lanes in any conflict with the USSR. The collapse of communism in 1989 and the 
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact had undermined this argument, as did Brooke's 
assertion that Britain no longer sought such a presence.31 What is particularly significant 
for our purposes is that the Brooke initiative explicitly identified the Army as an issue in 
any peace process. He attempted to balance a number of factors, demonstrating flexiblity 
over its future, but also reassuring Unionists over a continuing military presence as long 
as the paramilitary threat remained. As Brooke's successor Sir Patrick Mayhew later put 
it, "the British presence in Ireland is not the Army or state, but a million Unionists."32  
The 1994 IRA Ceasefire  
The Brooke initiative bore fruit only slowly. In particular, the IRA was determined to 
maintain the military pressure. Toward the end of 1990 it began to use hostage drivers to 
deliver bombs. This involved tying alleged informers into lorries loaded with bombs and 
forcing them to drive straight into British Army posts. Also in 1990 the Conservative MP 
Ian Gow, a vociferous supporter of the Unionists and close friend of Mrs Thatcher, was 
blown up by a car bomb in front of his home in England. One of the IRA's most 
spectacular "successes" during this period was in 1991, when they launched a mortar 
attack on Downing Street which came close to killing the British Gulf War Cabinet. In 
April 1992, the IRA continued its campaign in England, detonating two huge bombs in 
London's financial sector, causing over £700M in damage - contrasting starkly with the 
£600M which had been paid in compensation in Northern Ireland. The IRA had 
demonstrated that it retained the capability to strike at the heart of the British political 
and financial establishment. Ironically, it was perhaps the new threat to financial 
institutions which was seen in London as the greater. In particular, the British authorities 
feared that further attacks might lead major financial institutions to relocate outside the 
UK.33
Despite these operational successes, and despite certain evidence that the IRA might be 
planning another "spectacular," the political leadership of the Republican movement was 
engaged in the process of rethinking its strategy. In February of that year, following 
internal debates over its future course of action, Sinn Féin published a peace initiative 
entitled, Towards a lasting peace in Ireland. According to some analysts this had the tacit 
approval of the IRA. The document was a watershed in the history of the movement in 
that several hitherto unquestioned "truths" were now revised. In particular, it emphasized 
the importance of the Southern Irish parliament (the Dail) - previously held to be an 
illegal institution - as a positive agent for change in the North. The document had, of 
course, the usual requirement for an eventual "peaceful and orderly British political and 
military withdrawal from Ireland," but perhaps most interesting was the view that the 
British might now be useful in obtaining Unionist consent to a united Ireland.34  
Adams at this point seized the political initiative through a dialogue with the SDLP and 
particularly its leader, John Hume. Confidential discussions began in April 1993. In 
October, these talks were made public when the Hume/Adams document was delivered to 
the Irish government.35 In contrast, Prime Minister John Major was circumscribed in his 
Irish policy because of his weak domestic position. The April 1992 General Election had 
returned Major to power but with only a slim majority of 21. Unionist support in the 
House of Commons was crucial as Major struggled to push forward a controversial 
strategy over Europe. In 1993, in a vote on the Maastricht Treaty, the Prime Minister 
faced a severe test of leadership over his European policies. The Unionists and colleagues 
sympathetic to their cause threatened to undo Major's European strategy if he pushed too 
hard on the issue of contacts with Sinn Féin.36 As it was, on 22 July 1993, it was Unionist 
support that saved the Maastricht Treaty. The relationship of the government with the 
Unionists, was further complicated when it became public knowledge that, despite 
repeated protestations to the contrary, it had been conducting a covert dialogue with Sinn 
Féin. By mid May 1993, the British and Sinn Féin had exchanged 16 letters and four oral 
messages,37 and Major had decided he would talk to the spokesmen of Sinn Féin. But 
after a renewed bombing campaign in England, most notably the bomb in Warrington 
which killed two young children, Major said that talking to Gerry Adams would "turn his 
stomach."38 In October 1993, the Southern Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, and John 
Major rejected the Hume/Adams proposals.39
This impasse was followed by a burst of Anglo-Irish activity between the Irish Foreign 
Minister, Dick Spring, and Sir Patrick Mayhew, in a bid to put together a joint initiative. 
In December, the response came in the form of an Anglo-Irish announcement known as 
the Downing Street Declaration. Many of the terms actually had been foreshadowed in 
the Hume/Adams talks. Of these the most important was the notion that a united Ireland 
could be achieved through negotiation and constitutional methods and that Sinn Féin 
would be included in the peace process on the basis of a permanent end to the use of 
violence. The British government also undertook to engage in direct talks with Sinn Féin 
as to how the violence could end.40 The IRA did not reject the Declaration out of hand, 
but rather mixed short-term ceasefires with attacks in England as it pondered its reaction. 
Although Sinn Féin eventually rejected the Downing Street Declaration at its Letterkenny 
meeting in July 1994, pressure for a ceasefire was building (not least from Dublin and 
Washington). On 31 August 1994, the IRA announced a ceasefire. It did not promise that 
it was permanent, but rather stated that it was a complete cessation of violence.41 In 
October, the Combined Loyalist Command also declared a ceasefire. This was crucial, as 
during the course of 1993 Loyalist paramilitaries had actually killed more people than 
had Republican groups.42
By the end of 1994 then, after the deaths of 3,171 people over 25 years, there was peace 
of a sort in Ireland. The political discussions and continued use of violence by the IRA 
obscured the very significant role played by the military and security forces in achieving 
this. In particular, the Army's ability to deny the IRA a military victory was a central 
element in the Republican reappraisal of strategy. The IRA was finding it increasingly 
difficult to operate in Belfast because of the increasingly effective intelligence operations 
by both the RUC and MI5. Indeed, Special Branch estimated that by 1994, 80 percent of 
all IRA operations in the city were intercepted.43 Nor was this type of efficiency limited 
to the city of Belfast. In rural areas a series of successes by security forces had disrupted 
IRA activities and imposed an unpalatable level of attrition on the organization. The 
IRA's failure to drive out the British after 25 years of violence led to a degree of war 
weariness and a questioning of the utility of the campaign of violence. This weariness 
was not universally shared (as seen by the emergence of splinter groups responsible for 
the 1997 bomb in Omagh), but by 1994 had developed sufficient momentum to lead to a 
ceasefire. In other words, the Army had over a number of years helped to create a 
situation whereby IRA violence was not reaping either military or political rewards. The 
Army had kept casualties to Reginald Maudling's infamous "acceptable" level and had 
imposed a degree of attrition on the IRA's active service units. As a result, a satisfactory 
military solution for the IRA was unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. In denying 
the IRA any hope of a military victory, the Army had created a situation whereby 
negotiations offered a better way forward.  
The role of the British security forces was not publicly recognized in order to avoid 
exacerbating Republican sensitivities at a crucial moment in the peace process. In 
particular, it was clear that the IRA would balk at the idea that negotiations equated to 
surrender. But it also had much to do with the British government's perspective on the 
"troubles." For successive British governments, the conflict in Northern Ireland had been 
deliberately portrayed not as a war but an "internal security" matter. As Charles 
Townshend has argued, from the mid-1970s onwards the movement away from the tacit 
recognition of the IRA through the removal of the "political" status of prisoners and the 
emphasis upon the RUC as the lead agent in security matters all meant the British 
government never conceded that Northern Ireland was a war - "indeed in British legal 
terms it was peace."44 This perspective is critical to understanding why the Army's role in 
the peace process has not been emphasized by those engaged in the politics of Northern 
Ireland.45  
Yet, if military attrition had been responsible (at least in part) for bringing the IRA to 
acknowledge that a military victory was not possible, actions by the Army impinged upon 
and in many ways undermined any progress toward a lasting political settlement. 
Tensions between the Army and the wider Catholic community were amply demonstrated 
when, in 1992, soldiers from the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (the Regiment 
which had been involved in the shootings on Bloody Sunday in 1972) were accused of 
harrassing locals in a pub in Coalisland, County Tyrone. This led to calls for the 
Regiment to be withdrawn from Northern Ireland, calls which extended across 
community lines. Nationalist critics of the Army argued that the role of the British 
military had not been about policing or containment but about raising the costs of 
operations for the IRA. In February 1992, for example, four members of the IRA were 
shot dead in Coalisland by the SAS during a paramiliatry attack on a police station. This 
led to sustained criticism over the behavior of the SAS.46 The publication of Mark 
Urban's Big Boy's Rules: The Secret War Against the IRA in 1993 brought these concerns 
to a wider audience. Urban, a former soldier turned journalist, alleged that the British 
Army at times had been authorized to "trap" and "kill" members of the IRA, albeit 
through operations within certain guidelines. Urban claimed that between 1976 and 1987 
the SAS and 14th Intelligence Company were responsible for the deaths of over 30 
Republican paramilitaries. To put this in context, members of the security forces on duty 
have been responsible for just over 300 fatalities since the beginning of the conflict.47 It is 
also the case that the SAS have only killed Republican, not Loyalist paramilitaries. While 
none of these allegations were completely new, alongside the complex peace 
negotiations, they raised sensitive questions about the British military role in Ireland. In 
recognition of this problem, and particularly after the attack at Coalisland, the British 
changed the policy by which the SAS were used in Northern Ireland. Urban states that 
during 1990-92 Army special forces had killed 11 Republican terrorists; after Coalisland, 
members of the SAS operating in Northern Ireland did not kill anybody. A senior SAS 
officer argued that the change in policy resulted from orders for a non-lethal policy from 
Stormont: ministers and senior police officers believed that further killings would inflame 
Republican opinion and jeopardize the secret contacts with Sinn Féin which had been 
established under Peter Brooke.48  
While these controversies did not go away, during 1993 the conflict nevertheless changed 
character. This was the first year of the troubles in which no IRA member was killed by 
the security forces, though Catholics continued to die as a result of an upsurge in violence 
by Loyalist paramilitaries. Nevertheless, despite attempts by the security forces, 
including the Army, to reduce tension with the Nationalist community, long-standing 
grievances continued to simmer. The controversy over the record of military forces was 
highlighted and exacerbated by the case of Private Lee Clegg. In 1993, Clegg was 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the alleged murder of Karen Reilly, a passenger in a 
car which had driven through an Army checkpoint in 1990. Supporters of Clegg 
campaigned for his early release arguing that he had acted within the rules of engagement 
governing the behavior of soldiers in Northern Ireland. The case aroused enormous 
controversy, not least because Nationalists had long raised the issue of how soldiers were 
treated in the courts, including the "secrecy rule," under which the identity of soldiers 
was not revealed for fear of assassination. In July 1995, Clegg was released on license at 
a difficult time both in Northern Ireland (because of the marching season) and in the 
peace process. His release led to rioting in Belfast, underlining the sensitivity of the 
Nationalist community to the behavior of the British Army and the treatment of serving 
soldiers within the judicial process.49  
After the ceasefires of August and October 1994, there was some scaling down of 
activities by the British security forces. Most noticeably, British Army patrols were 
withdrawn from the streets of Belfast and Londonderry. Soldiers replaced their protective 
helmets with berets and rifles were no longer carried in the ready-to-fire position. Army 
support for police patrols was reduced by three quarters and in Belfast withdrawn 
altogether. In October, a number of bases were closed and 104 closure orders on border 
roads in Northern Ireland were rescinded. Pressure was also successfully brought to bear 
in Londonderry to remove the large observation tower at RUC Rosemont police station 
(although in November 1996 the Army constructed a new "security tower" nearby, 
despite Nationalist complaints).50 These moves had been foreshadowed in a secret 54-
page document drawn up by the Army in 1992 with the knowledge of the police and 
passed to the IRA as part of the process to encourage a ceasefire. Several Army units 
were returned to barracks in Germany and the Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Patrick 
Mayhew, formally stated in December 1994 that the role of the Army on the streets of 
Northern Ireland was fast diminishing.51 There were, however, clear limits to this scaling-
down. The British government refused to listen to the case advanced both by Gerry 
Adams and Mitchel McLoughlin, the Sinn Féin National Chairperson, that 
demilitarization and the decommissioning process should include the weaponry of the 
British security forces. Although John Major was prepared to withdraw some troops, he 
was not prepared to concede the principle that the British Army could be equated within 
the peace process with a paramilitary organization.52  
Despite the peace process and the reduced Army presence, violence both within and 
between Catholic and Protestant communities remained a problem. In the year following 
the first IRA ceasefire, 218 "punishment beatings" took place, 85 by Loyalist gangs and 
133 by Republican gangs. (Indeed, by the summer of 1999 the level of violence within 
the Catholic community led Unionist politicians to urge the Northern Ireland Secretary to 
declare the IRA ceasefire to be over.)53 At this stage there was little indication on the 
British side that it was ready to address many of the controversial issues which the peace 
process had raised. Not the least of these was the issue of covert British activity in the 
province over the past decades and the outstanding issue of the behavior of the Parachute 
Regiment in 1972. However, it was not just the British Army which came under scrutiny 
over its past: Sinn Féin faced increasing pressure to persuade the IRA to reveal the 
location of the hidden bodies of some of its victims - the so-called "disappeared." In 
1994, there was little indication of movement on these issues, but as the peace process 
wore on it became increasingly obvious that a number of issues from the past, including 
the Army's past, had to be addressed to secure trust in a new and more peaceful order.54  
The Mitchell Report  
With the IRA and Loyalist ceasefires in place, two sets of talks emerged. The first - the 
"strands" - examined future political structures in Northern Ireland and its relationship to 
the South and to the UK; the second focused on decommissioning. From the start the 
relationship between the two sets of talks was problematic. What, if anything, was the 
linkage? How should they be sequenced? Particularly, should talks on decommissioning 
precede talks on future political structures? The British government attempted to clarify 
its position on these issues when Sir Patrick Mayhew visited Washington in March 1995. 
Its position (expressed in what became known as the "Washington Three") was that for 
Sinn Féin to join the talks the IRA had not only to indicate its willingness to disarm but to 
begin decommissioning before gaining entry to the talks, thereby demonstrating its 
commitment to peaceful means and engaging in confidence-building. Although the 
British government's insistence upon prior decommissioning broadly satisfied Unionist 
concerns it was unacceptable to the Republicans. In particular, the idea of the IRA 
handing over its weapons to British security forces smacked of surrender. The Irish 
government was also beginning to suspect that the decommissioning issue was being 
used by London to slow down progress. To break the impasse on decommissioning, the 
two governments launched in November 1995 the Twin Track Initiative. The first track 
involved preparatory multi-party talks to establish a framework for substantive 
negotiations; the second created an independent commission, chaired by former US 
Senator George Mitchell, to examine the decommissioning of paramilitary arms.55 The 
Mitchell Commission reported in January 1996 and proposed its own solution to the key 
problem of when to decommission - that decommissioning should move in parallel with 
all-party negotiations rather than precede or follow them. The report also introduced six 
principles "of democracy and non-violence" to which all parties involved in negotiation 
should "affirm their total and absolute commitment."56 "Signing up" to the Mitchell 
Principles quickly became a formal requirement for entry into the talks.  
The Mitchell Report was seen by Dublin as providing the way forward and indeed the 
Mitchell compromise quickly became the policy of both governments on how to 
sequence talks and decommissioning. The Mitchell compromise, however, proved 
unpopular with the Unionists who maintained their support for prior decommissioning. 
Nor was it embraced wholeheartedly by the Major government. In particular, Major's 
decision to call elections to an assembly which would in turn provide the basis for 
representation at the multi-party talks was seen by Dublin as an attempt by London to 
downplay the significance of Mitchell.57 More importantly, the decision to call elections 
was the last straw for the IRA. From the Republican perspective, the Major government 
had backtracked on its commitment in the Downing Street Declaration to allow Sinn Féin 
into negotiations on the sole proviso of an IRA ceasefire. With the ceasefire in place, 
Major had then insisted on decommissioning before talks; with the Mitchell compromise, 
Major had now asked for elections. This created deep distrust within the Republican 
community over the British government's real intentions. On 9 February 1996, the IRA 
exploded a bomb in London's Docklands, breaking its ceasefire and beginning a 
campaign on the mainland that later escalated to Northern Ireland itself. Despite severe 
provocation, Loyalist paramilitaries formally kept to their ceasefire, though the Orange 
Order and Apprentice Boy marches in 1996 and 1997 created a series of crises which 
threatened to destroy the entire peace process.  
Although the Army played a key role in monitoring the IRA ceasefire, during this period 
its role appears largely to have been sidelined while attention focused on the 
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons.58 Attempts by Sinn Féin to argue that the 
military arsenal of the security forces, including the British Army, should form part of 
that process, continued to fail. Sinn Féin argued that the endpoint of the peace process 
should be the full demilitarization of Northern Ireland, and that since the Army could not 
be expected to disarm it should leave. But Major insisted that the Mitchell Commission 
could only go ahead if Army weaponry was excluded and that the focus was on "illegal" 
weaponry. Although Sinn Féin argued in its representations to the Mitchell Commission 
that the weapons of the security forces should be included in decommissioning,59 this was 
not accepted. In its Report, the Commission stated:  
Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the 
Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those 
weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no 
equivalence between such weapons and those held by the security forces. However, in the 
context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the 
Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, 'to continue to take 
responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat 
reduces.'60  
In other words, changing the Army's role would be a useful confidence-building measure, 
but would not be central to the decommissioning process.  
At this time, therefore, the British government still insisted that the Army was a neutral 
force in Northern Ireland and that its continued presence was required due to the potential 
for a return to violence. Unionists shared this perception. What both underestimated were 
continued Nationalist sensitivities over the behavior if not the actual presence of the 
Army. These were amply illustrated when in December 1996 relatives and friends of the 
14 men killed by the Parachute Regiment during Bloody Sunday 24 years previously 
objected to the proposed deployment of three battalions of the Regiment into Northern 
Ireland.61 A less controversial but related issue was that of what might be termed the 
"nuisance" factor associated with the Army. Foot patrols were accused of spreading TB 
among cattle by crossing between quarantined and unaffected farms. In addition, the 
noise of helicopter patrols in some areas was a long running bone of contention between 
residents and the military.62 Sinn Féin spokespeople continued to argue that the British 
Army should be withdrawn, claiming that, rather than the Army reducing its presence, the 
reverse was actually occurring in Catholic West Belfast, including an enlargement of its 
base on the 18th floor of the Divis flats.63  
In the midst of these controversies, a crucial role for the Army remained that of urban 
peacekeeping. This proved particularly important during the "marching season" of July 
and August each year, when both communities commemorate historic occasions through 
a series of parades. (Since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 there has 
been a one-third increase in parades in Northern Ireland. In 1995 alone there were 3,500 
marches of which 2,581 were Loyalist.) Many of the marching routes run through 
communities which bitterly resent such displays. This problem was particularly acute in 
1995 when the Chief Constable of the RUC, Sir Hugh Annersley, decided to allow the 
Orange Order parade at Drumcree to march down the Garvaghy Road, despite the 
objections of the Catholic residents. In part this decision was taken because the Chief 
Constable feared that the RUC on its own would not be able to contain the situation if the 
Unionists were not allowed to march. Critically, additional troops were not available 
because of over-stretch in the Army caused by the British deployment in the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Although there was much criticism of the decision to allow the 
marchers through, it is difficult to see what other decision the Chief Constable could have 
taken. RUC officers policing the march had been subjected to fierce intimidation. 
Although a battalion of the Parachute Regiment was available as backup, Annersley still 
did not believe that the situation could be controlled without additional troops being 
available, indicating the continued significance of the Army in Northern Ireland. The 
situation at Drumcree was repeated in 1996, when again the march was allowed to pass 
down the Garvaghy Road, despite complaints from the residents. This decision came after 
significant Unionist pressure, notably from David Trimble and the leader of the 
Democratic Unionist Party, Ian Paisley, who warned of bloodshed if the marchers were 
not allowed down the Garvaghy Road.64 Sir Patrick Mayhew argued that he could not 
guarantee the ability of the RUC to hold the line in such a situation and that there was 
little alternative to the use of British military forces in a policing role.65  
The Stormont ("Good Friday") Agreement  
By the end of 1996 the peace process was moribund. The IRA had broken its ceasefire, 
arguing that the British government had not made good on its commitment to involve 
Sinn Féin in the talks process, while the Major government itself was beset with internal 
difficulties over Europe. Uncertainty over the loyalty of its backbenchers was 
compounded by a reliance on Unionist support in the House of Commons. As a result, the 
process stalled and little progress was made. In summer 1997, however, new 
governments in London and Dublin provided the necessary impetus to reinvigorate the 
process. The new Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, was viewed by Nationalists as being 
more committed to the peace process than his predecessor John Bruton had been, while 
Tony Blair systematically addressed the concerns expressed by Sinn Féin over the peace 
process. This included an attempt to meet some of the Nationalist concerns over the 
Army by reducing its visibility in Northern Ireland. Not least during the summer of 1997, 
the Army reduced the number of its helicopter flights. In other words, from the very 
beginning Blair's Labour government appeared to accept that the Army was a major issue 
in the peace process and that a number of measures could be taken which would assist 
progress in negotiations.  
On 3 June 1997, the multi-party talks which had been suspended for the British General 
election campaign recommenced and on 19 July the IRA announced a second ceasefire. 
This removed the single largest stumbling block to Sinn Féin's participation in talks. On 6 
August, the new Labour Secretary of State Mo Mowlam met a Sinn Féin delegation at 
Stormont to discuss a wide range of issues, but emphasized that the IRA's statement on 
restoring the ceasefire had to "be reflected in words and deeds" before Sinn Féin could 
join the talks process.66 Unlike Major's government, which took six months before 
making the "working assumption" that the ceasefire was genuine, it took Labour six 
weeks. During this period the Army was heavily involved in preparing reports on the IRA 
ceasefire. On 29 August, Mo Mowlam announced her decision to allow Sinn Féin entry 
to the talks. This was based on her assessment, following a report from General Sir 
Rupert Smith, the Army's commanding officer in Northern Ireland, that the ceasefire was 
indeed genuine.67 The sole proviso was that Sinn Féin formally sign the Mitchell 
Principles on democracy and non-violence. This they did on 9 September at a plenary 
session of the multi-party talks, with the major Unionist parties notable by their 
absence.68 The way had nevertheless been opened for direct and substantive talks which 
culminated in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement at Stormont on 10 April 1998.  
The Good Friday Agreement committed the British government to "make progress 
towards the objective of as early a return as possible to normal security arrangements in 
Northern Ireland, consistent with the level of threat." This was an important qualification 
aimed at reassuring Unionists. When the agreement was signed, no terrorist weapons had 
been handed in and doubts remained in Unionist communities over whether the IRA 
ceasefire was genuine or merely "tactical." The agreement clearly stated that the 
government would aim to reduce troop numbers "to levels compatible with a normal 
peaceful society;" that security installations would be demolished; and that emergency 
powers to assist the police and Army would be removed.69 What had been hinted at in the 
Brooke initiative was now made real, subject to continuing improvements in the security 
situation.  
For the Unionist community in particular, whose support for the Good Friday Agreement 
was critical but uncertain, a substantial Army presence was a necessary reassurance for as 
long as the potential for paramilitary threats remained. From the Unionist perspective, 
premature reductions could threaten security rather than contribute to it, particularly 
given the lack of decommissioning by the IRA. A linkage was therefore identified 
between Army reductions and IRA decommissioning. Nevertheless, from July on troops 
(including 250 soldiers from the Parachute Regiment) began to leave Northern Ireland 
following a scaling down of security and from the autumn of 1998 all Army patrols in 
Belfast ceased.70 There was, however, no commitment to removing the Army wholly and 
permanently. A force would remain; the resident Royal Irish Regiment would not be 
disbanded; and the ability to recall troops if the situation deteriorated was implicit. 
During July 1997, fears that sectarian violence would flare at Drumcree led many 
thousands of people within the province to leave their homes. Four hundred extra troops 
from the Staffordshire Regiment, Britain's emergency standby battalion, were deployed 
to Northern Ireland at the request of the RUC. This brought the number of service 
personnel on duty in Northern Ireland to 17,500. Thereby, ironically, the peace process 
had seen a short-term increase in the number of troops deployed into Northern Ireland. 
The atmosphere of crisis was further fuelled by threats from a "breakaway" Unionist 
paramilitary group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to kill civilians in the Irish 
Republic if the rights of the Unionist marchers at Drumcree were curtailed.71  
Learning the lessons from the previous year, troops from the Parachute Regiment trained 
with police officers to prevent massed ranks of Orangemen congregating at Drumcree 
Church.72 Other troops which were newly deployed to Northern Ireland were trained to 
deal with public order disturbances before beginning their tour of duty; so-called 
"refresher courses" were also provided in the run up to Drumcree. In addition, RUC 
officers were trained in the use of military Saxon armoured cars, as all the RUC land 
rovers were expected to be used at Drumcree itself.73 In 1998, the Parades Commission 
decided not to allow the Orange Order to march down the Catholic Garvaghy Road at 
Drumcree. This again produced a stand-off between the Orange Order and the security 
forces, which erupted into public disorder. Because of the violence, the Army was once 
more deployed in strength at Drumcree.  
In this situation of inter-communal violence, the presence of the British Army in terms of 
both numbers and discipline was considered indispensable. The use of military personnel 
had an additional and rather unexpected advantage in that, unlike members of the RUC 
who tended to live locally, the homes and families of serving soldiers could not be so 
easily threatened. During the heightened tension of the marching seasons of 1997 and 
1998 much time was spent by RUC officers guarding the homes of fellow officers 
threatened by paramilitaries. The British Army was, nearly 30 years after its initial 
deployment, once again primarily engaged in holding the line between the two estranged 
communities.  
CONCLUSION 
The British Army was influential - directly and indirectly - in the establishment of the 
Northern Ireland peace process. Its most direct impact was in containing paramilitary 
violence, especially from the IRA. Partly as a result of this the Republican movement 
revised its strategy of the "ballot box and armalite" and moved toward a strategy of 
seeking constitutional change. Persuaded that a military victory was unlikely, the IRA 
eventually agreed to a ceasefire in 1994 and again in 1997, the latter allowing Sinn Féin 
to participate directly in multi-party talks on new devolved political structures designed 
to engender bi-communal support. Indeed, in the year 2000, the IRA itself initiated a 
process whereby in return for an extension in the date set for paramilitary 
decommissioning, it agreed to a process whereby some of its arms would be put beyond 
use in sealed bunkers.74  
The military factor was also indirectly influential in that the Brooke initiative addressed a 
number of Nationalist concerns over the troop presence, including the crucial declaration 
that the British government had no obvious strategic interest in Ireland. John Major's 
government opted to primarily focus efforts on issues other than the military, including 
decommissioning and new political structures. Although the Major government were well 
aware of the concerns of Sinn Féin, the SDLP and Dublin over issues relating to an Army 
presence, room for manoeuvre on this issue was limited both by domestic weaknesses, in 
particular the narrow Conservative victory in 1992 which gave Unionist MPs influence, 
and by concerns over the ability of the RUC to police the province without the military.  
The counterfactual question of what Major would have done if he had had a stronger 
domestic position is, like all such questions, problematic to answer. Major was deeply 
suspicious of Sinn Féin and the IRA and inclined, personally and politically, toward a 
cautious approach.75 Nevertheless, the Army's role did change at this time. Its profile was 
reduced, operating procedures were changed to build local confidence and SAS activities 
were restrained. Troop numbers did not, however, fall significantly, nor were Nationalist 
grievances over army behavior addressed. In particular, during the critical period of the 
Mitchell Report, the British government refused to engage with Sinn Féin's arguments 
concerning the decommissioning of security force weapons or indeed the legacy of the 
military presence within the Nationalist community. 
Under the Labour government of Tony Blair there were a number of significant changes 
of emphasis and attitude toward the military situation in Ireland. In particular, Blair, 
despite his avowed commitment to Unionism, and first Mo Mowlam, then her successor 
Peter Mandelson, have demonstrated a greater sensitivity to issues relating to the historic 
legacy of the conflict in Ireland. In October 1997, for example, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield 
was tasked with establishing a commission to look at the pain and suffering caused by the 
30 years of troubles. In May 1998, a Minister for Victims was appointed with a budget of 
some £5 million and a concerted attempt was made to persuade the IRA to reveal the 
secret location of graves of IRA victims.76 There were other signs of a change of style: in 
deference to local feeling, helicopter patrols were reduced and neither Blair nor Mowlam 
visited Army bases in the province. The litmus test, certainly for the Nationalist 
community, however, concerned both the early release of paramilitary prisoners and the 
controversial events of Bloody Sunday. The Major government had refused to reopen the 
latter issue, despite new evidence over the shooting of the 14 Catholic protesters, thus 
endorsing the findings of the original Widgery Report which had exonerated members of 
the Parachute Regiment. On the 26th anniversary of the shootings, Blair announced a 
new independent judicial review under Lord Saville, having already apologized for the 
events of that day.77  
The Blair government has demonstrated that it understands that an examination of past 
military behavior within the province is a necessary prerequisite for Nationalist 
confidence in any peace settlement. Blair has also shown that he understands the 
symbolism of the British military presence. Indeed, there is now agreement between 
senior British politicians and security service chiefs that additional watchtowers in the 
province will be demolished in a bid to further entrench the IRA in the peace process.78 
There are, however, other pressing issues which need to be addressed if the Good Friday 
Agreement is to hold. Not the least of these is whether the IRA will at some point disarm, 
despite the fact that its demands for total demilitarization and the removal of the Army 
from the province have failed.79 If the IRA does indeed disarm, the crucial question is 
what security apparatus does the province need and whether the RUC or its successor 
body can successfully police a society divided by years of sectarian hatred. Until both 
these issues are resolved, the military will remain in Ireland.80  
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